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Perhaps the only way out of this labyrinth, at least where both internal and
external restrictions are involved, is to make the standard turn in every case on
the Secretary's defense in an action for wrongful denial of a passport. If the
Secretary claims the denial is grounded on protection of the nation's security the
court may well require a showing of a "clear and present danger" or some
similar standard to uphold the denial of a passport. If, on the other hand, the
defense is that to grant a passport would impair the conduct of foreign affairs
the court's competence should be limited to a determination of whether or not
the denial was "reasonably related to the conduct of foreign affairs." In the last
analysis, perhaps, the basic political process must be relied upon to compel the
Secretary to answer the charge in good faith.'
10 Judge Wyzanski has advanced two considerations which seem particularly appropriate
from the standpoint of legislative policy: (1) If through travel controls criticism of American
policy abroad is prevented, we tacitly take responsibility for that which is "uncensored";
(2) Our international status would be improved by allowing our citizens freely to speak
abroad-this policy best sells a tradition of liberty. Consult Wyzanski, Freedom To Travel,
190 Atlantic Monthly, No. 4, at 66 (Oct., 1952). Constitutional rights and passport procedures
have been recently the subject of hearings of the Subcommittee on Constitutional Rights of the
Senate Judiciary Committee. N.Y. Times, p. 22, col. 3 (Nov. 16, 1955).
BANK ACCOUNTS: TRANSFER OF PROPERTY AT DEATH
I. THE JOINT AND SURVIVORSHIP ACCOUNT-
ADMISSIBILITY OF PAROL EVIDENCE
"The familiar joint bank account has had an uneasy career in the courts,"'
because the joint bank account with right of survivorship, to which one party
has contributed all the funds, 2 resists characterization as either a gift or a con-
tract.3 There is a lack of that divestment of control over the res of the account
required for the finding of an executed inter vivos gift,4 and there is a problem in
finding consideration to support a transfer of funds from the donor to the donee
by contract.' Yet characterization as gift or contract affects the result in a con-
' Schaefer, J., in Estate of Schneider, 6 Ill. 2d 180, 183, 127 N.E. 2d 445, 447 (1955).
2 Most of the cases involve an account to which total contribution was made by one de-
positor. This party is usually called the donor or donor-depositor, even though the transaction
is not always cast in terms of gift. The terms donor and donee will be used throughout to
denote the parties to the joint account. For the origin of this terminology see Matthew v.
Moncrief, 135 F. 2d 645 (App. D.C., 1943).
3 The account is upheld by a variety of theories: Contract, Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920,
48 N.W. 2d 870 (1951); Gift, State Board of Equalization v. Cole, 122 Mont. 9, 195 P. 2d 989
(1948); Trust, McDevit v. Sponseller, 160 Md. 497, 154 At. 140 (1931).
'Consult Cleveland Trust Co. v. Scobie, 114 Ohio 241, 151 N.E. 373 (1926). The question of
delivery, in that case regarded as delivery of funds, can more accurately be thought of in terms
of a gift of a chose in action against the bank that creates a joint and survivorship interest in
the donee. See page 294 infra.
kEstate of Schneider, 6 Ill. 2d 180, 127 N.E. 2d 445 (1955); see also Estate of Edwards,
140Q Ore. 431, 14 P. 2d 274 (1932) (discussing problem of consideration where both depositors
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test over ownership of funds between the estate of the donor and the donee-sur-
vivor: Courts generally reach contrary results in admitting parol evidence to
vary the terms of the deposit agreement depending on their adoption of a gift or
a contract theory.' This comment will examine the two theories, with emphasis
on Illinois law, and consider them in terms of their effect on the application of
the parol evidence rule.
The nature of the survivorship right is identical to that in a common law
joint tenancy.7 The surviving joint depositor is entitled to the funds remaining
in the account at the time of the death of the other depositor, to the complete
exclusion of the deceased depositor's estate.8 While the nature of the survivor-
ship interest is clear, the question of when it is an incident of a joint bank ac-
count has given the courts difficulty.9 In Illinois requisites for the creation of a
joint bank account with right of survivorship are established by statute. 10
had contributed to the account). The problem of consideration is relevant only as between
the account holders. The position of the bank is controlled by statute. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955)
c. 76, § 2(a) at note 10 infra.
6 Compare Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920,48 N.W. 2d 870 (1951) (contract theory excluding
parol evidence) with Murray v. Gadsden, 197 F. 2d 194 (App. D.C., 1952) (gift theory admit-
ting parol evidence).
7 3 Holdsworth, History of English Law 126 (1923). But the account cannot be thought of
in terms of joint tenancy for "[t]he four unities [time, title, interest and possession] of the
common-law joint tenancy, the notion of an undivided moiety in each joint tenant, and the
difficulty of applying the common-law concept of joint tenancy to a fluctuating res have caused
difficulties.... [The relationship established by a joint bank account is not that of joint
tenancy, but rather is one which is governed by the provisions of the agreement between the
bank and the depositors." Schaefer, J., in Estate of Schneider, 6 Ill. 2d 180, 183, 184, 127 N.E.
2d 445, 447, 448 (1955).
8 E.g., Spikings v. Ellis, 290 111. App. 585, 8 N.E. 2d 962 (1937). The survivorship interest
has escaped even the Internal Revenue Bureau, and is not subject to lien for the unpaid
income tax of the decedent. Tooley v. Commissioner, 121 F. 2d 350 (C.A. 9th, 1941). But for
conditions where the estate will be held see Reinecke v. Commissioner, 220 F. 2d 406 (C.A. 8th,
1955) (fraudulent attempt to avoid payment of taxes).
9 The problem turns on the determination of the donor's intent. Because different courts
adopt different views of what is sufficient to demonstrate the requisite intent, the same facts
will not achieve. the same effect in all instances, and a conflict as to when the survivorship
interest will exist is created. Compare Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920, 48 N.W. 2d 870 (1951)
with Estate of Schneider, 6 Ill. 2d 180, 127 N.E. 2d 445 (1955).
10 The statute provides: "When a deposit in any bank or trust company transacting
business in this State has been made or shall hereafter be made in the names of two or more
persons payable to them when the account is opened or thereafter, such deposit or any part
thereof of any interest or dividend thereon may be paid to any one of said persons whether
the other or others be living or not, and when an agreement permitting such payment is signed
by all said persons at the time the account is opened or thereafter the receipt or acquittance of
the person so paid shall be valid and sufficient discharge from all parties to the bank for any
payments so made." Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 76, § 2(a). Under this statute it has been held that
the survivorship right will exist only upon execution of a jointly signed written expression of
the intent of the parties. Doubler v. Doubler, 412 Ill. 597, 107 N.E. 2d 789 (1952). Previously
the appellate courts had held that joint signature was not necessary to creation of the sur-
vivorship right. Johnson v. Mueller, 346 Ill. App. 199, 104 N.E. 2d 651 (1952); Vaughan v.
Millikin National Bank, 263 Ill. App. 301 (1931). The Doubler case represents a tightening of
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However, a recent Illinois decision indicates that compliance with the statu-
tory requirements does not insure the creation of the survivorship interest.
Estate of Schneider" involved a conflict between the surviving donee-depositor
and the estate of the donor-depositor. There the account had been opened in
compliance with the statutory requirements. Both parties had signed a signa-
ture card which provided that "one signature only [is] required for withdrawal"
and that the account was to be held "as joint tenants with right of survivorship
and not as tenants in common." The court held that this agreement created a
mere presumption that the joint account with right of survivorship had been
created. The estate could rebut this presumption by coming forward with evi-
dence showing that the donor did not intend the funds to be jointly owned, or
that survivorship was not intended. However, the burden of persuasion to show
that the donor intended to make a gift remained on the donee-survivor. As this
burden could not be sustained, the funds were awarded to the estate.
The Schneider case was a departure from previous Illinois law since it held
that to create a joint bank account with right of survivorship there must have
been a gift, and that the court may consider all material evidence bearing on the
intent of the donor to make a gift. Previously the joint bank account had been
thought of in terms of contract," and the parol evidence rule was believed to
apply.13 Under the contract theory the testimony which led the court in the
Schneider case to conclude that no survivorship interest was intended would
have been excluded, and the funds would have gone to the survivor.
The contract rationale had its inception in Erwin v. Feller,4 and was devised
to circumvent holdings, 5 based upon an interpretation of statutes existing at
that time," that there could be no joint tenancy in personal property. Illinois
the requirements needed for creation of the survivorship incident. But the statute is drafted
in two clauses and it could be construed so that joint signature would be required only for ac-
quittal of the bank.
- 6 Il. 2d 180, 127 N.E. 2d 445 (1955), aff'g 2 Ill. App. 2d 560, 120 N.E. 2d 353 (1954).
12 Estate of Wilson, 404 11. 207, 88 N.E. 2d 662 (1949); Reder v. Reder, 312 Ill. 209, 143
N.E. 418 (1924); Illinois Trust and Savings Bank v. Van Vlack, 310 Ill. 185, 141 N.E. 546
(1923); Erwin v. Felter, 283 Ill. 36, 119 N.E. 926 (1918); Cuilini v. Northern Trust Co.,
335 Ill. App. 86, 80 N.E. 2d 275 (1948); Estate of Halaska, 307 In. App. 183,30 N.E. 2d 117
(1940); Estate of McIlrath, 276 Ill. App. 408 (1934); cf. Estate of Koester, 286 In. App. 113,
3 N.E. 2d 102 (1936) (safe deposit box).
1 Cuilini v. Northern Trust Co., 335 Il. App. 86, 80 N.E. 2d 275 (1948); Estate of NlCI-
rath, 276 Ill. App. 408 (1934); see Illinois Trust and Savings Bank v. Van Vlack, 310 Ill. 185,
141 N.E. 546 (1923).
14283111.36, 119 N.E. 926 (1918).
15 Hay v. Bennett, 153 Ill. 271, 38 N.E. 645 (1894) (personalty); Lemen v. Estate of Grote,
203 Ill. App. 50 (1916) (joint bank account).
16 joint tenancy with right of survivorship was abolished in all property by the Act of Janu-
ary 13, 1821, IIl. Rev. Stat. (1845) c. 56, § 1, and reinstated as to realty by the Act of July 1,
1827, 111. Rev. Stat. (1845) c. 24, § 5. The implication was that joint tenancy in personalty
was not allowed and the cases cited at note 15 supra so held. Both of these statutes have been
repealed. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1919) c. 76, §§ 5, 6.
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Trust and Savings Bank v. Van Vlack'7 extended the authority of the Erwin case
and said that "evidence of the inconsistent [to the contract] words or acts of the
parties is not competent." 8
The implication of characterizing the joint bank account in terms of contract
was that the rights of the depositors would be determined by rules applicable to
written contracts generally. This implication, together with the dictum of the
Van Vlack case quoted above, led the appellate court in Cuilini v. Northern
Trust Co.,19 a survivorship contest where both depositors had signed a deposit
agreement,20 to exclude parol evidence inconsistent with the terms of the con-
tract.21
In rejecting the Cuilini decision, the court in the Schneider case refused to
allow the survivor to claim a direct contract right on the grounds that there was
no consideration to support a transfer of the funds from the donor to the donee.
Recovery could not be allowed on the theory that the deposit agreement was a
third party beneficiary contract for "that ... begs the question by assuming
that the contract is for the benefit of the beneficiary. 2 2 Since a transfer to the
survivor by bequest would be testamentary in nature and invalid under the
Statute of Wills, 23 the court concluded that the survivor's interest could exist
only as a result of an executed inter vivos gift.2 4
Some courts have overcome the problem of consideration to support the con-
tract between the donor and the donee by holding that execution of the deposit
agreement creates and vests equal rights, with survivorship, in all the deposi-
17310 11. 185, 141 N.E. 546 (1923).
11 Ibid., at 192, 548.
"' 335 111. App. 86, 80 N.E. 2d 275 (1948).
20 But cf. Johnson v. Mueller, 346 Ill. App. 199, 104 N.E. 2d 651 (1952), where parol evi-
dence was admitted to determine the intent of the depositors. The case is distinguishable be-
cause it involved certificates of deposit, and, more important, there was no jointly signed
deposit agreement providing for survivorship.
21 The Schneider and Cuilini decisions were by the same appellate court. Compare these
contrary holdings with the parallel decisions of Murray v. Gadsden, 197 F. 2d 194 (App. D.C.,
1952) and Matthew v. Moncrief, 135 F. 2d 645 (App. D.C., 1943). For a discussion of the
Gadsden case consult McDonnell, Joint Bank Accounts: The Four Unities and Stare Decisis,
42 A.B.A.J. 57 (1956).
22 6 Ill. 2d 180, 184, 127 N.E. 2d 445, 448 (1955).
21 Some courts have had difficulty with the testamentary aspect of the survivorship account
and have declined to uphold the account because of its seeming violation of the Statute of
Wills. E.g., People's Savings Bank in Providence v. Rynn, 57 R.I. 411, 190 At. 440 (1937).
This point is not controlling in the Schneider case but could be if the intent of the donor ap-
peared to be to make a transfer taking effect only at his death. It could be argued that the
effect of the statutes controlling the joint and survivorship account would be to remove this
account from the purview of the Wills statute. See note 10 supra and note 50 infra.
24 The court then cited Bolton v. Bolton, 306 Ill. 473, 138 N.E. 158 (1923), to show that
the facts and circumstances surrounding the transaction may be inquired into to aid in ascer-
taining the intention of the parties. That case is distinguishable because it did not involve
a written agreement purporting to take the place of delivery. See note 49 infra.
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tors.2 Since the contract is executed no consideration is needed 28 Other courts
do not discuss the problem of consideration flowing between the donor and the
donee, and regard the deposit of funds with the bank as sufficient consideration
to support the contract between the bank, the donor, and the donee.2 7 Under
either theory the contract is held to be determinative of the rights of all the
parties thereto, and since it is a dear expression of the depositor's intent to own
the funds as joint tenants with right of survivorship, parol evidence is not ad-
mitted 8 The pre-Schneider Illinois cases "9 did not discuss the problem of con-
sideration. Yet the contracts in these cases could be regarded as executed con-
tracts that directly determined the rights and duties of the parties. The problem
of consideration can thus be solved, and no reason is seen why the contract the-
ory ought to have been overruled in favor of the gift theory.3"
The survivor in the Schneider case is not a third party beneficiary because he
is a party to the contract, and a direct promisee of the bank. The fact that the
words of the bank's promise are directed to the survivor brings him "in privity,"
and prevents him from being a stranger or "third party" to the contract.3 The
difference between a third party beneficiary contract and a contract in which the
consideration comes from one other than the moving promisee is not great, for
the "third party" is a beneficiary of the contract, and the "promisee" is a bene-
2Estate of Harvey v. Huffer, - id. App. -, 126 N.E. 2d 784 (1955); Sage v. Flueck,
132 Ohio 377, 7 N.E. 2d 802 (1937); Malone v. Sullivan, 136 Kan. 193, 14 P. 2d 647 (1932);
and cases cited at note 12 supra.
2 Sage v. Flueck, 132 Ohio 377, 7 N.E. 2d 802 (1937); Cleveland Trust Co. v. Scobie, 114
Ohio 241, 151 N.E. 373 (1926); cf. Miers v. Charles H. Fuller Co., 167 11l. App. 49 (1912).
27 Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920, 48 N.W. 2d 870 (1951). In an appropriate case the account
might be upheld as a contract creating a present right to future enjoyment of the funds in the
donee on consideration of the donee's promise to transact the donor's banking business until
his death. See Armstrong v. Morris Plan Industrial Bank, 282 Ky. 192, 138 S.W. 2d 359 (1940)
(account upheld on contract theory where consideration was prior service of donee). This idea
is perhaps implicit in the statement of the dissent in the Schneider case that "there is nothing
to negate the fact that Schneider, while remaining cognizant of the convenience of the arrange-
ment, may still have intended [the survivor] to have the money remaining in the account upon
his death just as the instruments provide." 6 I1. 2d 180, 194, 127 N.E. 2d 445, 452 (1955).
28 E.g., Hill v. Havens, 242 Iowa 920, 48 N.W. 2d 870 (1951); Sage v. Flueck, 132 Ohio
377, 7 N.E. 2d 802 (1937).
29 See note 12 supra.
:0 Of course it may be argued that this executed contract is merely a means of effecting a
gift by way of novation. Consult 4 Corbin, Contracts § 914 (1951). No essential difference
appears between this and making.the transfer of the chose by means of a gratuitous written
assignment, see note 49 infra, and no real difference in application of the parol evidence rule
should appear. The executed contract theory seems to be a shorthand way of adopting the
policy of regarding the execution of the deposit agreement as conclusive of the intent of the
parties.
1 Consult Tweedale v. Tweedale, 116 Wis. 517, 93 N.W. 440 (1903) (conveyance of prop-
erty by A to B in part consideration for B's promise to C to pay him $100.00 held to create
enforceable contract right in C); 4 Corbin, Contracts § 779 (1951); Rest., Contracts § 75
(2) (1932).
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ficiary of the donor. 32 In cases involving either contract the essentials of proof
are the same: it must be shown that the survivor was intended to have a benefit
under the contract. 33 Thus the court's remarks directed to the unacceptability
of the third party beneficiary contract 34 may be taken as directed to the
unacceptability of the contract where the survivor is a promisee and the con-
sideration flows from the donor. In rejecting the beneficiary rationale necessary
to support either type of contract, the court is saying that even if the survivor
proved the existence of the deposit agreement, in order to claim as a beneficiary
of the contract (or of the donor) he would have to assume that the contract was
made for his benefit. Since the point for determination was for whose benefit was
the contract made, the court said that this assumption begs the question and
defeats the survivor's argument. Implicit in this statement is the conclusion
that the deposit agreement does not show an intent on the part of the donor to
constitute the donee a joint owner of the funds.with right of survivorship. But
the survivor should be allowed to prove that the donor intended to benefit him;
and if the court is to admit parol evidence, it must decide that the deposit agree-
ment is not a clear expression of the donor's intent to create a joint ownership
with right of survivorship in the donee.35 .While it is thus clear that the court
could have phrased its decision in terms of a beneficiary type contract, it is
doubtful that the application of the parol evidence rule would have been thereby
changed. Essential to recovery as a donee beneficiary is a showing that the donor
intended to make a gift to the donee."5 Presumably the same evidence admitted
under the gift theory adopted by the court would be admissible here.
7
The gift theory, adopted in the Schneider case, differs from the contract the-
ory in that it requires the survivor to show in a clear and convincing manner
that the donor intended to give him a chose in action against the bank that
would entitle him to a joint and survivorship interest in the funds. In order to
resolve the problem of delivery, 8 the gift must be of a contract right against the
bank, and not of the funds themselves, because retention of a right in the donor
12 4 Corbin, Contracts § 779, 782 (1951).
33 Ibid. § 776; Rest., Contracts § 133 (1) (a) (1932).
34 See text at note 22 supra.
5 For a discussion of the relationship of intent and the jural act see 9 Wigmore, Evidence
§ 2413 (3d ed., 1940). The law cannot examine the will of the donor, nor should it place sole
reliance on the act itself if the consequences appear unreasonable. But it is not unreasonable to
presume that the donor intended the donee to have a joint and survivorship interest in the
funds when the deposit agreement contains the words "joint tenants with right of survivor-
ship" to describe the ownership of the depositors. Carrying out the suggestions of note 68
infra would strengthen the case for holding the donor to his act in the absence of mistake,
fraud, or duress, and discourage litigation.
36 Rest., Contracts § 133 (1) (a) (1932).
37'E.g., Carson Pirie Scott & Co. v. Parrett, 346 Ill. 252, 178 N.E. 498 (1931) (donee ben-
eficiary contract to be construed in light of all attendant circumstances).
"8 See note 4 supra.
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to withdraw the funds is a retention of control that would defeat the creation of
a gift even if the donor's intent to make the gift were clearly demonstrated.39
The joint bank account is a creature of both contract and gift.4 These two
factors interact to the extent that the gift theory depends on contract for crea-
tion of the subject of the gift and for evidencing delivery.4" In the application of
the contract theory the donee receives something for which he does not pay. This
interdependence makes a characterization exclusively in terms of either contract
or gift quite artificial. However the account is characterized, no difference in the
application of the parol evidence rule should result.42 The question to be deter-
mined is the same in either event: Did the donor intend the donee to hold a
joint and survivorship interest in the funds? Courts adopting the contract the-
ory generally regard the execution of a deposit agreement providing that the
depositors shall hold the funds "as joint tenants with right of survivorship" as
conclusive of this question of intent, and do not admit parol evidence to vary
the terms of the contract.4" Courts adopting the gift rationale often admit parol
evidence, 44 apparently on the theory that execution of the deposit agreement is a
substitute for the manual delivery usually required in a gift of a chattel. 45 Since
parol evidence is admitted to explain and determine the purpose of delivery,"
the same evidence is admitted to explain and determine the purpose of the writ-
ing.47 But delivery is not required as an end in itself; it is rather based on policy
39 Estate of Waggoner, 5 Ill. App. 2d 130, 125 N.E. 2d 154 (1955) (must be an absolute and
irrevocable parting with all future and present dominion over res in order to effect valid inter
vivos gift).
40 Consider Kepner, The Joint and Survivorship Bank Account: A Concept Without a
Name, 41 Calif. L. Rev. 596, 635 (1953), where it is suggested that the joint bank account is
so anomalous as to be sui generis.
41 Castle v. Wightman, 303 Mass. 74, 20 N.E. 2d 436 (1939) (deposit agreement held to
take place of delivery).
42 Accordingly some courts that accept the gift theory do not admit parol evidence. Consult
Commerce Trust Co. v. Watts, 360 Mo. 971, 231 S.W. 2d 817 (1950) (executed deposit agree-
ment providing funds to be owned "jointly with right of survivorship" held conclusive of
question of intent to make gift); State Board of Equalization v. Cole, 122 Mont. 9, 195 P. 2d
989 (1948) (execution of deposit agreement creating account payable to either or survivor
settles question of donative intent); Furjanick Estate, 375 Pa. 484, 100 A. 2d 85 (1953) (no
parol evidence on question of donative intent in presence of wrilten agreement).
43 Cases cited at note 28 supra.
44 Murray v. Gadsden, 197 F. 2d 194 (App. D.C., 1952); consult dissent of Hershey, J., in
Estate of Schneider, 6 Ill. 2d 180, 188, 127 N.E. 2d 445, 450 (1955).
45 See note 41 supra.
4 E.g., McIntosh v. Fisher, 125 Ill. App. 511 (1906).
47 Extrinsic evidence could be admitted to show that the act was not intended to have
jural effect. Thus as it can be shown that no contract was intended because of jest, it can be
shown no gift was intended because of a desire on the part of the donor to increase insurance
coverage for the account, see note 55 infra, or that a mere agency realtionship was con-
templated. But this logic can be attacked by pointing up the distinction between showing a lack
of intent to achieve any jural effect (for which parol evidence can be admitted) and showing no
intent to achieve a Particular jural effect, for which parol evidence cannot be admitted unless
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that seeks to: (1) make clear to the donor the nature of his act, (2) make the na-
ture of the act clear to contemporary witnesses and (3) give to the donee some-
thing to show as evidence of his claim.4s No substitute for delivery should be
required to do more; and it is arguable that if the donor executes an instrument
that achieves these three objectives, thus dearly expressing his donative intent,
he should be held conclusively to his act.49 The gloss of judicial logic compels no
conclusion; the Illinois. Court was not bound to admit parol evidence even after
its repudiation of the contract theory.: ,
The new Illinois Savings and Loan Act, passed since the Schneider decision,
presents another argument for regarding the executioh of a written agreement
providing for payment to either depositor or the survivor as conclusive of the
rights of the parties in any contest involving deposits in Savings and Loan
Associations. The statute provides:
If two or more persons opening or holding a withdrawable capital account shall exe-
cute a written agreement with the association providing that the account shall be
payable to any or the survivor of them, the account, and any balance thereof which
exists from time to time, shall be held by them as joint owners with right of survivorship
and, unless otherwise agreed, any payment by the association to any of such persons
shall be a complete discharge of the association's obligation as to the amount so paid.
[Italics supplied.]5
It is difficult to argue that this provision merely provides for acquittal of the
association, as the emphasized words are not essential to achieve this purpoeAs'
the effect is not clear from the terms of the agreement. 9 Wigmore, Evidence § 2435 (3d ed.,
1940). Parol evidence can be admitted to show if the deposit agreement was to have jural
effect, but not to show what that effect was intended to be. This must be determined from
the face of the writing, and, if unambiguous, parol evidence will be excluded. See note 42
supra. It might be held that the writing was not clear as to the intent to make a gift, and
better results would be achieved if the Schneider rule were so limited. Ingenious drafting of
deposit agreements might obviate the rule. See note 68 infra.
18 Consult Mechem, The Requirement of Delivery in Gifts of Chattels and of Choses in
Action Evidenced by Commercial Instruments, 21 Ill. L. Rev. 341 (1926).
49 The question is whether or not parol evidence will be admissible to vary the terms of a
written gratuitous assignment of a chose in action when the words of the writing clearly import
intent to make a gift. This question has not received much consideration outside the context
of joint bank accounts, see note 42 supra, but in the case of Mahan v. Plank, 289 Fed. 722 (C.A.
7th, 1923), where a gift was evidenced by a letter, it was held that the letter itself would
furnish the decisive test as to whether or not a gift inter vivos was established. While the rela-
tionship of the parties, the reasonableness of the gift, or the subsequent or contemporaneous
acts of the parties could help explain any ambiguous language of the letter, they could not
change the rights of the parties as fixed by the letter.
10 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32, § 770 (a).
" If the provision cannot satisfactorily be construed in two clauses, one providing for
acquittal of the association and one determining the ownership of the funds, it may still be
argued that this type of ownership is a condition to the bank's acquittal, and if the condition
is not met the bank will not be free of.liability. Since the statute plainly says the bank is to be
free of liability, it must also say that the condition of ownership is fulfilled upon execution of the
written agreement. The words of this statute should be compared with those of Ill. Rev. Stat.
(1955) c. 76, § 2(a) at note 10 supra.'
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If the words mean anything they mean that the property rights of the depositors
are determined by the terms of the deposit agreement. The words of the statute
suggest that the court should not apply the Schneider rule to accounts covered
by the provisions of the new Savings and Loan Act.52
The joint bank account with right of survivorship is widely used to pass
property on death without the formality of a will and to avoid the expense and
delay of probate proceedings. 3 The popularity of the joint account can be at-
tributed to the combination of joint life withdrawal power and the right of sur-
vivorship. Convenient availability of funds is coupled with certainty of immedi-
ate passing to the survivor of the balance in the account at the death of the
donor. There is a need for certainty in any instrument that has the effect of
transferring a testamentary interest." The Schneider rule, admitting parol evi-
dence in the survivorship contest, has destroyed this certainty and limited the
efficacy of the joint bank account when used to effect what is in reality a testa-
mentary intent.
The court in the Schneider case probably admitted parol evidence because of
a belief that injustice would result when a joint account with right of survivor-
ship is opened by depositors having no testamentary intent, but who use the
account for agency or other purposes.15 Admitting parol evidence protects the
51 But a series of events in New Jersey serves as an example of what may be done with
such statutes. A similar provision was there enacted in 1948. N.J.L. (1948) c. 67, § 217,
N.J.R.S. (Cum. Supp., 1950) 17: 9A-217 (applying to pay on death accounts). This was held
to establish no conclusive presumption of ownership in the survivor in the case of Fruzynski
v. Radler, 23 N.J. Super. 274, 93 A. 2d 35 (1952) (involving a joint account). The legislature
thereupon amended the statute to provide for a conclusive presumption of ownership in the
survivor upon the death of the donor. N.J.L. (1954) c. 209, § 2, N.J.R.S. (Cum. Supp., 1955)
17: 9A-217 (B). The amended statute has not yet been construed by the courts, but the legis-
lative intent would seem fairly clear. The 1948 statute applicable to joint bank accounts,
N.J.R.S. (Cum. Supp., 1950) 17: 9A-218, was worded more strongly than § 217, and it is sur-
prising that the survivor did not attempt to rely on it in the Fruzynski case. § 218 was amended
at the same time as § 217 and now provides that the monies remaining in the account at the
death of the donor "shall... vest solely and indefeasibly in the survivor." N.J.R.S. (Cum.
Supp., 1955) 17: 9A-218 (B).
63 "Bank accounts in this form are opened not infrequently by the simple and the humble."
Cardozo, J., in Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251 N.Y. 380, 398, 167 N.E. 506, 512 (1929) (holding
survivor's ownership conclusive on death of donor); In re Wilkin's Will, 131 N.Y. Misc. 188,
226 N.Y. Supp. 415 (Surr. Ct., 1928); Havighurst, Gifts of Bank Deposits, 14 N.C.L. Rev.
129 (1936). An example of the conceptions of one donor-depositor can be seen from an ex-
amination of Kittredge v. Manning, 317 Mass. 689, 59 N.E. 2d 261 (1945), where the donor
said, "I want Nora to have that money. You know, a bank account with two names is iron
clad." (Emphasis supplied.) Ibid., at 691, 262.
"1 Consult Rheinstein, The Law of Decedents' Estates c. 17 (1955) (on the subject of the
testamentary instrument); Havighurst, op. cit. supra note 53, at 159 admits it desirable to re-
gard the question of intent, after the death of one of the parties, as conclusive on the form of
deposit agreement.
"Russell and Prather, Legal Aspects of Savings Accounts, 19 U.S. Savings and Loan
League LegalBulletin 1 (1953), points out this agency misuse and recommends that a power of
attorney be used instead. The account is also used to avoid bank regulations of one sort or
another, Havighurst, op. cit. supra note 53, at 131, and to obtain increased insurance coverage
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agency depositor at the expense of destroying certainty in the operation of the
right of survivorship. But the agency intent can be effected in many ways,6
while the joint account with right of survivorship is the only account that
couples the present right of joint withdrawal with the right of survivorship.
Derogation from the use for which the account is uniquely qualified will result
if the certainty necessary to effective operation of the right of survivorship is
destroyed.
It might be argued that provisions of Illinois law57 authorizing banks to pay
funds in a trust account to a named party on the death of the depositor are
better adapted for use to effect a quasi-testamentary intent than a joint bank
account with right of survivorship. Whether or not the rights of the named party
axe considered conclusive," this account is not an effective substitute for the
joint bank account. While the trust account may be satisfactory to a depositor
who can afford to place funds both in an account solely for testamentary pur-
poses and in another account for present joint withdrawal, it is not adapted for
use by those of more modest means who must combine the right of present joint
withdrawal with the quasi-testamentary power of disposition.
The dissent in the Schneider case"9 suggested that if the rights of the survivor
were not to be regarded as conclusive upon the death of the donor the rule of the
Schneider majority might be improved by applying different rules of evidence.
The rule announced in the Schneider case6 places the burden on the survivor to
under Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation. 64 Stat. 873 (1950), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1821(f)
(Supp., 1955). The insurance coverage does not depend on the state of the account between
the depositors in that the funds may have been a mere gift from donor to donee. Conner v.
F.D.I.C., 112 Vt. 380, 26 A. 2d 105 (1942).
56 E.g., Russell and Prather, op. cit. supra note 55, at 18, where power of attorney pro-
visions are made on the face of the individual account card. Thus a simple and readily avail-
able meaiis of creating an agency relationship is provided without the objectionable survivor-
ship provisions.
57 Banks: Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 161, § 145. Savings and Loan Associations: Inl. Rev. Stat.
(1955) c. 32, § 770(b) (c).
Is Consult Savings-Account Trust-Validity Under Illinois Law, 23 U. of Chi. L. Rev.
301 (1956).
69 6 Ill. 2d 180, 188,127 N.E. 2d 445,450 (1955).
.s An example of the, implications of the Schneider rule in other areas of joint bank account
law is found in its possible effect on the operation of the Illinois Inheritance Tax Law which
conclusively requires inclusion, of a pro rata share of the funds in the estate of.a deceased
joint depositor regardless of the amount of actual contribution to the account. Ill. Rev. Stat.
(1955) c. 120, § 375 (5). The estate will be taxed the same amount, in any given case, whether
the decedent':contifbuted more or less than a pro rata share of the funds. A tax loss to the
donee's estate would occur in the event the donee predeceased the donor.'This loss might be
avoided by showing, under the rule of the Schneider case, that no joint. and survivorship
account was intended, and that therefore the tax ought to be levied only on the" donor's
estate at the time of his subsequent death.,
.Extension of the presumption rule to inter vivos contests would affect Brown v. First
National Bank, 271 Ill. App. 424 (1933),.which held that a creditor by merely showing the
fact of.a jiuntaccount in. the name of his debtor andzanother had not .made out a.prima.fade
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show in a clear and convincing manner that the donor intended the funds to be
jointly owned. This must be done by proving that the donor intended a gift of
an interest in' the funds- to the donee, a task that may be very difficult. 6' The
dissent suggested that once the survivor had proved the execution of the deposit
agreement the estate should carry the burden of persuasion that no joint owner-
ship was intended 2 The difference between the two rules might, however, be
negligible, as evidence sufficient to rebut the presumption of joint ownership or
survivorship would probably be sufficient in many cases to persuade the trier of
fact that no joint and survivorship ownership was intended. 3I Another alternative to the Schneider rule would be recognition of a distinction
between conflict over ownership of the funds during the joint lives of the de-
positors and a conflict after the death of one. This distinction is recognized in
New York where it is held that the usual rebuttable presumption of joint ten-
ancy becomes conclusive as to all funds remaining in the account at the time of
the death of either depositor. 4 This presumption remains rebuttable as to any
funds withdrawn by either of the parties before the death of the other. 5 This
case as to his right to attach the account. Consistency would now require the debtor-depositor,
upon the creditor showing the execution of the joint deposit agreement, to come forward with
evidence showing that no joint account was intended, or that he had not actually contributed
to the account. In the absence of such a showing the creditor should be allowed to attach up to
6ne-half the funds in the account. Consult Murphy v. Michigan Trust Co., 221 Mich. 243,
190 N.W. 698 (1922).
61 The donee is not allowed to testify in his own behalf where the adverse party is the
executor, administrator, heir, legatee, or devisee of any deceased person. Ill. Rev. Stat.
(1955) c. 51, § 2. Rothwell v. Taylor, 303 Ill. 226, 135 N.E. 419 (1922) (donee not competent
to testify to acts and words of donor after death of donor).
62 See Greener v. Greener, 116 Utah 571, 212 P. 2d 194 (1949) (agreement conclusive unless
attacked on grounds of fraud, mistake or other incapacity, or unless shown by clear and con-
vincing proof that the parties intended instruments to have different effect from that ex-
pressed).
. 63 Professor McCormick points up the fact that those who attempt to avoid the working
of the parol evidence rule are generally the lower economic classes, and where the trial is to
the jury the outcome would be influenced to favor the "underdog" to the deprecation of
written agreements that fairly express the intent of the parties. Another factor is the suspected
disinclination of the jury to evaluate fairly the unreliability of the oral testimony of interested
parties. McCormick, The Parol Evidence Rule as a Procedural Device for Control of the
Jury, 41 Yale L.J. 365, 366 (1932). Basic to determination of the proper application of the
parol evidence rule is an empirical evaluation of actual use of the joint and survivorship
account. Cursory inquiry seems to indicate that the majority of depositors are aware of the
implications of the survivorship provisions, and often are motivated to use the account by
the very presence of this incident. The courts should not jeopardize the position of those de-
positors on the basis of their acquaintance with the pathological occurrence.
"1 Marrow v. Moskowitz, 255 N.Y. 219, 174 N.E. 460 (1931); Moskowitz v. Marrow, 251
N.Y. 380, 167 N.E. 506 (1929).
" Ibid. This is true of funds held in savings banks, N.Y. Banking Law (McKinney, 1950)§ 239(3), but not of those held in commercial banks or trust companies. See N.Y. Banking
Law (McKinney, 1950) § 134(3). The conclusive presumption applies only in the absence of
fraud or undue influence. The origin of this distinction applicable on the death of one of the
depositors may be traced to Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904).
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distinction was recognized by implication in previous Illinois case law. Parol
evidence was admitted to show relative ownership of the funds during the joint
lives of the parties," and was thought to be excluded after the death of one of the
depositors.8 7 The New York rule assures certainty in the passage of the survivor-
ship interest without affecting the inter vivos rights of the parties.
A possible improvement of the New York rule would be statutory definition
of different types of deposit agreements with a requirement that banks furnish
these forms before being released from liability for payment to one of the de-
positors.8 These cards should be drawn with prominent language on their face
that explains in understandable terms what the effect of deposit of thefunds and
signature of the agreement would be.19 If the conclusiveness of the execution of
an agreement creating the right of survivorship has been objected to on the
grounds that the term "joint tenants with right of survivorship" is not under-
standable to the layman, this objection would be met by these new forms.
Parol evidence would be excluded in the absence of fraud, duress or mistake.
56 Swofford v. Swofford, 327 Ill. App. 55, 63 N.E. 2d 615 (1945). Of course this evidence is
still admitted. Scanlon v. Scanlon, 6 Ill. 2d 224, 127 N.E. 435 (1955).
67 Cases cited at note 13 supra.
68 See notes 10 and 50 supra. "Unfortunately, many institutions have been exceedingly
lax in the opening of [joint and survivorship] accounts, and it is largely through the failure
of such institutions to properly advise their customers of the implications of the several types
of accounts and their failure to take proper precautions initially which has given rise to the
unseemly amount of litigation on the subject." Russell and Prather (counsel for United
States Savings and Loan League), op. cit. supra note 55, at 8. The article states that a trans-
fer from the donor to a third party and then to the bank to be held for the donor and the
donee as "joint tenants with right of survivorship and not as tenants in common and not as
tenants by the entirety" will improve the chances of creating a valid joint and survivorship
account. This is on the theory that the four unities of time, title, interest and possession will
then be found to give effect to the donor's intent. See ibid., at 10, 22. The futility of such
subtlety is apparent. A more profitable approach would be to devise a card that expressed the
donative intent so clearly that a child could understand. The result of this would be to force
the Illinois Court to decide whether the Schneider case stands for the proposition that no
deposit agreement, however clear, would be operative to exclude parol evidence, or only that
the type of card found in the case itself was not sufficient to achieve that end.
11 A statement in large clear type to the effect that the party should not execute this card un-
less it is intended that his co-depositor should take all the funds upon his death, to the exclusion
of his wife and children, would do away with much of the misuse of the joint and survivorship
account. Three types of account would suffice to clear confusion: (1) One in which both parties
have a present right of withdrawal with the right of survivorship to either, for both con-
venience and testamentary intent; (2) One in which each has a present right to withdraw, but
with the survivorship right in the donor only, to effect the agency intent; (3) One in which
the donee has no present right of withdrawal but obtains the funds upon the death of the
donor, to effect the testamentary intent. Consult Disposition of Bank Accounts: The Poor
Man's Will, 53 Col. L. Rev. 103, 116 (1953), where additional cards to create pay on death
and trust accounts are suggested. The above-mentioned three accounts correspond to the
former conception of the joint and survivorship account, an individual account with power
of attorney, and a trust account. Since these accounts can all be created at the present time,
the real force of the statute would be to define them more clearly and require banks to furnish
the standard forms with explanation.
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II. THE SAVINGS-ACCOUNT TRUST-VALIDITY
UNDER ILLINOIS LAW
Numerous savings accounts in Illinois banks or savings and loan associations
have been established by depositors designating themselves on the deposit card
as trustee for a named beneficiary.' By so doing the depositor-trustee retains
complete control over the account as long as he lives; he may deposit, withdraw,
or close out the account at will, and he may change the beneficiary by making
out a new deposit card.2 For more than thirty years' the institutions holding
funds so deposited have paid them to the designated beneficiary upon the death
of the depositor-trustee, but there is no explicit Illinois authority which upholds
these savings-account trusts4 by declaring the beneficiary's interest even pre-
sumptively secure from attack by persons claiming an interest in the estate of
I An officer of a large Chicago bank estimated that the bank had "many thousands"
of savings-account trusts and that the same situation would be found in all large Chicago
banks. In one savings and loan association it was estimated that approximately one-third of
its 50,000 accounts were trust accounts. Strangely, the trust account appears to be less ex-
tensively used in the smaller neighborhood banks in Chicago.
2 Of course the depositor-trustee may amend the trust so as to make it irrevocable or to
restrict his interest or control. A more restrictive trust of a savings deposit may also be created
at the time of opening the account. Consult 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 47 (1951); 89
C.J.S., Trusts § 54 (1955). This comment, however, is concerned only with the validity of
the "standard" revocable savings-account trust.
3 The savings-account trust was officially recognized in Illinois in 1921 when the legislature
passed a statute designed to protect banks from liability if they paid the balance in the trust
account to the beneficiary on the death of the depositor-trustee. The statute provides: "If a
deposit is made with any corporation doing a banking or trust business by one person in trust
for another, the name and residence of the person for whom it is made shall be disclosed, and
it shall be credited to the depositor as trustee for such person; and if no other notice of the
existence and terms of a trust has been given in writing to such corporation, the deposit or
any part thereof, together with the interest thereon, may, in the event of the death of the
trustee, be paid the person for whom said deposit was made, or to his legal representative."
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1951) c. 16j, § 23. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32, § 953, enacted in 1939, provides
similar protection for savings and loan associations. Consult also note 27 infra for text of the
new Savings and Loan Act.
These statutes have never been interpreted by the Illinois courts. The few cases which have
interpreted very similar statutes in other states have held that the statutes did not establish
any rights in the beneficiary-they merely absolved the paying institutions from liability to
persons claiming an interest in the estate of the depositor-trustee. Consult 1 Bogert, Trusts
and Trustees § 47, at 323 n. 62a (1951); 4 Powell, Real Property § 571, at 436 nn. 33 and 34
(1954).
4 Widespread interest in the savings-account trust was stimulated by the decision in Matter
of Totten, 179 N.Y. 112, 71 N.E. 748 (1904) in which the New York court held that: "A de-
posit by one person of his own money, in his own name as trustee for another, standing alone,
does not establish an irrevocable trust during the lifetime of the depositor. It is a tentative
trust merely, revocable at will, until the depositor dies or completes the gift in his lifetime
by some unequivocal act or declaration, such as delivery of the passbook or notice to the
beneficiary. In case the depositor dies before the beneficiary without revocation or some de-
cisive act or declaration of disaffirmance, the presumption arises that an absolute trust was
created as to the balance on hand at the death of the depositor." Ibid., at 125, 752. Since
then the savings-account trust has been sanctioned by many courts (authorities cited note S
infra) and by the Restatement of Trusts, § 58 (1935).
1956]
THE UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW
the deceased depositor-trustee.5 This comment will examine a recent Illinois
case and the new Savings and Loan Act6 which, while not dealing expressly with
the problem, indicate that the savings-account trust may well be a valid inter
vivos trust in'llinois.
The savings-account trust has been attacked on several technical grounds:
(1) It is an illusory inter vivos trust because the control over the corpus of the
trust retained by the depositor is so great as to bar an .effective vesting of a
present interest in the beneficiary;7 (2) This control of the deposit retained by
the depositor and the fact that the beneficiary's interest is contingent upon his
surviving the depositor render the savings-account trust inherently testamen-
tary and void, therefore, for failure to comply with the statute of wills;8 (3) Be-
cause the settlor could have had other reasons for establishing a savings-account
trust, his intent to vest an interest in the beneficiary is equivocal and should not,
therefore, be presumed.9
6 The validity of the savings-account trust probably will have to be tested by a suit be-
tween the trust beneficiary and some other person claiming an interest in the estate of the de-
ceased depositor-trustee. Though the banks and savings and loan. associations have a great
interest in the determination of this question, they have no justiciable interest due to protec-
tive legislation. Consult statutes cited note 3 supra and note 27 infra.In states in which the validity of the savings-account trust has been tested, it has gen-
erally been upheld to the extent that the beneficiary has on the death of the depositor-trustee
a presumptive right to the balance in the account, subject to rebuttal by evidence that the
depositor did not intend to vest any interest in the beneficiary. Kosloskye v. Cis, 70 Cal. App.
2d 174, 160 P. 2d 565 (1945); Delaware Trust Co. v. FitzMaurice, 26 Del. Ch. 101, 31 A. 2d
383 (1943), mod' on other grounds by Crumlish v. Del. Trust Co.,'27 Del. Ch. 374, 38 A. 2d
463 (1944); Wilder v. Howard, 188 Ga. 427, 4 S.E. 2d 199 (1939); Hale v. Hale, 313 Ky. 344,
231 S.W. 2d 2 (1950); (joint deposit stated to be in trust for depositor and beneficiary) Bollack
v. Bollack, 169 Md. 407, 182 At. 317 (1935); Cazallis v. Ingraham, 119 Me. 240, 110 At. 359
(1920); Walsov. Latterner, 143 Minn. 364, 173 N.W. 711 (1919); Matter of Totten, 179 N.Y.
112,-71 N.E. 748 (1904); In re Scanlon's Estate, 313 Pa. 424, 169 Atl. 106 (1933); Malley's
Estate v. Malley, 69 R.I. 407, 34 A. 2d 761 (1943).
A few states treat the bare form of the deposit as ambiguous and insufficient to justify a
presumption of a valid trust, Hogarth-Swann v. Steele, 294 Mass. 396, 2 N.E. 2d 446 (1936);
Fleck v. Baldwi, 141 Tex. 340, 172 S.W. 2d 975 (1943).
Only New Jersey has recognized a conclusive right in the beneficiary. NJ. Rev. Stat.
(1954) § 17:9A-216.
Consult 1 Bogart, Trusts and Trustees § 47, at 323 n. 62a (1951); 89 C.J.S., Trusts § 67
(1955).6 Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32, §§ 701 to 944.
Criticism is more usually directed to the combination of control and survivorship re-
quirement because of the prevailing liberal views on retention of control by the settlors of
trusts. Analysis of the retained control also arises in connection with original trust intent,
note 9 infra, revocation of the trust, note 19 infra, and rights of third parties to the deposit, note
34infra. Consult 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 47, at 318 nn. 50-54 (1951).
8 The courts have paid relatively little attention to the testamentary difficulties in the
savings-account trust. Cf. Packard v. Foster, 95 N.H. 47, 56 A. 2d 925 (1948). In the main it
has been the commentators who have raised this objection, consult 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trus-
tees § 47, at 335 n. 94a, § 104 (1951); Scott, Trusts and the Statute of Wills, 43 Harv. L.
Rev. 521, 542 (1930). Compare The Theory of the Tentative Trust, 87 U. of Pa. L. Rev. 847
(1939).
9 Other possible uses of the trust account, depending on state statutes and local banking
policy, are to avoid limits on the size of savings deposits, to obtain greater interest on small
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The problem of the control retained by the settlor in the savings-account trust
should not cause difficulty in Illinois. In Kelly v. Parker0 the Illinois Supreme
Court upheld a three-party trust of real estate in which the settlor retained a life
interest in the use and income; a power to let, demise, mortgage, sell and convey
in fee or less (the settlor retaining a right to the proceeds); and a power of rev-
ocation. Despite the retention of virtually complete control over the disposi-
tion of the corpus, it was held that the onveyance vested a present interest in
the beneficiary. This tendency to find a present vesting despite the retention by
the settlor of virtually complete control in the three-party trust context has
received undeviating support in IllinoisO In 1955, in Farkas v. Williams, 2 the
Illinois Court extended that liberal tendency to include a declared trust even
though the cases could be distinguished on the theory that conveyance of title
to a third party is a manifestation of -an intent to convey some interest to the
beneficiary which is absent where the settlor retains title as trustee."
The Farkas case was a suit by the administrators of the estate of the deceased-
settlor-trustee against the trust beneficiary to determine the validity of a de-
clared trust in shares of a mutual investment fund. The settlor retained a life
interest in the income and the power as trustee "to vote, sell, redeem, exchange,
or otherwise to deal in or with the stock .... -14 The trust was to terminate as to
any portion of the stock sold or redeemed, the settlor to retain the proceeds.
The settlor also had the power to change the beneficiary or to revoke the trust
at any time upon formal notice to the investment corporation.'5 The death of the
deposits, and to take advantage of state tax rules favoring small deposits. Consult 1 Bogert,
Trusts and Trustees § 47, at 333-334 nn. 87, 91 and 93 (1951); and Bogert, The Creation of
Trusts by Means of Bank Deposits, 1 Corn. L.Q. 159 (1916). However, by far the most impor-
tant advantage in the use of savings-account trusts is the possibility of increasing the coverage
of federal deposit insurance. Whereas each ordinary account is limited to $10,000 insurance, a
division of deposits between several trust accounts may produce coverage for all of the de-
positor's funds. Consult Federal Savings and Loan Insurance Corp. Act, 48 Stat. 1255 (1934),
as amended, 12 U.S.C.A. § 1724 (Supp., 1955); Federal Deposit Insurance Corp. Act, 64 Stat.
873 (1950), 12 U.S.C.A. § 1813(m) (Supp., 1955). The savingsand loan provision seems clearly
to provide coverage for each account of a depositor-trustee, whereas, until recently, the de-
positor-trustee in a bank was insured in an amount equalling $10,000 of the aggregate of his per-
sonal account and trust accounts. A recent interpretation gives $10,000 coverage for at least
one trust account in addition to $10,000 coverage for the personal account. Consult Current
C.C.H. Fed. Banking Law Rep. 92,583 (1955).
10 181 Ill. 49, 54 N.E. 615 (1899).
11 Bear v. Millikin Trust Co., 336 Ill. 366, 168 N.E. 349 (1929); Gurnett v. Mutual Life Ins..
Co., 356 Ill. 612, 191 N.E. 250 (1934); Bergmann v. Foremen State Trust & Savings Bank,
273 Ill. App. 408 (1934).
125I1. 2d 417,125 N.E. 2d 600 (1955).
1 Consult 1 Scott, Trusts § 57.6 (1939).
14 Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill. 2d 417, 420, 125 N.E. 2d 600, 602 (1955).
1In determining that there was a valid trust intent, the court emphasized this require-
ment of notice, arguing that its presence divested the settlor-trustee of complete freedom to
deal with the stock as his own. In fact, an absolute owner would also have to notify the com-
pany of any proposed lifetime disposition of the shares since relemption is the customary and
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beneficiary before the settlor-trustee would automatically terminate the trust.
Believing that these powers were realistically no more pervasive than those held
by the settlor in a revocable three-party trust such as Kelly v. Parker,8 the Il-
linois court sustained the beneficiary's interest.17
The Farkas trust is strikingly similar to a declared trust of a withdrawable
capital account in a sayings and loan association or of a savings account in a
bank.18 If a depositor declares that he 'holds the account in trust for a named
beneficiary, the interests of the depositor-trustee and the beneficiary are sub-
stantially identical to those created in the Farkas trust.19 The settlor in both
situations, besides retaining a life interest, can destroy. the trust by revoking or
consuming the corpus. Realistically, the beneficiary's interest in either case
amounts to a mere expectancy.
The provision for automatic termination of. the trust in: the event that the
easiest method of transferring shares in open-end mutual investment companies. Consult, for
example, Prospectus, Investor's Mutual, Inc. (Jan. 10, 1955). The settlor-trustee in the
Farkas case, therefore, lost no freedom of inter vivos disposition by establishing the trust. He
did, however, lose the power to dispose of the shares by will, which he could have done without
notifying the company if he were the absolute owner. Consult note 19 infra.
10181 Ill. 49, 54 N.E. 615 (1899).
17The court said: "It is obvious that a settlor with the power to revoke and to amend the
trust at any time is, for all practical purposes, in a position to exert considerable contol over
the trustee regarding the administration of the trust. For anything believed to be inimicable
to his best ifiterests can be thwarted or prevented by simply revoking the trust or amending
it in such a way as to conform to his wishes." Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill. 2d 417, 430, 125 N.E.
2d 600, 607 (1955).
"s In the Farkas case the Illinois Court relied upon United Bldg. and Loan Ass'n v. Garrett,
64 F. Supp. 460 (D. Ark., 1946), a case involving a declared trust of a savings and loan share
certiqcate, as most closely approximating the Farkas trust. It should be noted, however,
that under Illinois law a certificate like the one in the Garrett case is in some degree dissimilar
to a withdrawable capital account in a savings and loan association. The holder of the latter
does not have all the attributes of a stockholder. His account entitles him to membership with
voting, rights, but his account is not subject to attachment for the debts of the association.
Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32, §§ 741, 762(c) and 763. Withdrawals can be made, a right not ac-
corded to the holder of a Garrett-type certificate, though the holder of the withdrawable capital
account is not considered the creditor of the association. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32, §§ 763
and 773(f). This last is the principal distinction between a withdrawable capital account and
a savings account in a bank-the holder of a savings account is considered a creditor of the
bank. Cicero State Bank v. Crowley, 115 F. 2d 1022 (C.A. 7th, 1940); People v. McGraw
Electric Co., 375 Ill. 241, 30 N.E. 2d 903 (1940).
19 A possible distinction may arise concerning the manner of revocation. In the Farkas trust
the settlor-trustee could not have revoked the trust in his will whereas revocation of savings
account ,trusts by will has generally been held effective. A mere residuary bequest without
more is ineffective to revoke a savings-account trust, but a specvc bequest of the deposit or a
bequest which will be ineffective without use of funds in the trust account has been held to
revoke the trust. Consult Manner and Sufciency of Revocation of Tentative ("Totten")
Trust of Savings Bank Account, 38 A.L.R. 2d 1243, 3t § 8 (1954). Generally, a trust in-
strument like the Farkas agreement which reserves the power to revoke in a specifed form is
only exercisable during the settlor-trustee's lifetime. Consult 3 Scott, Trusts § 330.8 (1939);
Exercise by Will of Trustor's Reserved Power To Revoke or Modify Inter Vivos Trust, 18
AL R, 2d 1010, 1014 (1951).
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beneficiary predeceases the settlor2 ° raises the statute of wills problem2 ' The
fundamental dogma is that any disposition inherently testamentary in char:
acter must comply with the statute of wills. The virtually complete control
retained by the settlor over the corpus plus the survivorship provision exposes
the savings-account trust to the argument that its establishment is really a
testamentary act.2 2 The Farkas trust had a survivorship clause, but in addition
to finding a present vesting, the court also met the non-compliance with the
statute of wills argument by pointing out that the purposes of the statute of
wills-which are to minimize the possibility of fraud, forgery, and coercion, and
to foster an awareness in the testator of the gravity of his act-3-were adequately
accomplished by the detail and formality surrounding the execution of the trust
instrument.
The Farkas case could be distinguished from the savings-account trust on this
ground:24 the formal documents executed in connection with holding the shares
of the mutual investment corporation as a trustee were somewhat more elabo-
rate and extensive than those customarily used in a savings-account trust.25
On the other hand, the standardized, simple form used in the savings-account
10 The form of the trust agreement used in Chicago banks is as follows: "All deposits in this
account are made for the benefit of... (name of beneficiary) ... (residence) ... (relation-
ship) ... (date of birth) ... (birth place) to whom or to whose legal representative said de-
posits or any part thereof, together with the interest thereof, may be paid in the event of
death of the undersigned trustee.... /s/Trustee." The wording of this form is clearly derived
from the statute quoted in note 3 supra and it is open to the argument that the use of the
words "or whose legal representative" means that survivorship of the beneficiary is not re-
quired, thus diminishing the statute of wills problem. It is more likely, however, that these
words were meant to apply to a situation in which the beneficiary was incapacitated, as prac-
tice and common understanding negate this contention. The Restatement of Trusts states
that the death of the depositor "terminates" the trust, § 58 comment (b) (1935). Consult
also 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 47, at 326 (1951); 4 Powell, Real Property § 571, at
435 n. 29 (1954); Manner and Sufficiency of Revocation of Tentative ("Totten") Trust of
Savings Bank Account, 38 A.L.R. 2d 1243, at § 3 (1954). The Savings and Loan Act leaves no
doubt that survivorship is required as it provides for payment to beneficiaries "who are living
at the death of the last surviving trustee." Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32 § 770(b)(3).
"1 The Illinois statute of wills is in Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 3, § 194.
"2 Consult 1 Scott, Trusts §§ 56.6 and 57.6 (1939).
"1 Consult 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 104 (1951).
4 The Illinois Supreme Court cautioned in the Farkas decision that it did not intend to
uphold every purported revocable inter vivos trust: "For the reasons stated, we conclude that
these trust declarations... constituted valid inter vivos trusts and were not attempted testa-
mentary dispositions. It must be conceded that they have.., a 'testamentary look.' More-
over, it must be admitted that the line should be drawn somewhere, but after a study of this
case we do not believe that point has here been reached." Farkas v. Williams, 5 Ill. 2d 417,
433, 125 N.E. 2d 600, 608 (1955). Consult note 19 supra, for another possible ground for dis-
tinction between the Farkas trust and the savings-account trust.
"The form of the trust agreement used in Chicago banks is set forth in note 20 supra.
The savings and loan associations presently use a more detailed trust agreement though its
implications are the same. Its greater formality and detail may be intended as proof that the
depositor-trustee's intent was unequivocal. Consult Russell, The Signature Card Should Fit
the Purpose, 21 U.S. Savings and Loan League Legal Bulletin 1 (1955).
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trust :perhaps provides better evidence of the depositor's intention and under-
standing, and the participation of the institution would tend to assure that the
,disposition was carefully and, seriously'made.26
The argument can also be made that the new Savings and'Loan Act removes
the savings and loan trust account from the operation of the statute of wills.
Section 770(b)(3) provides:
Upon the death of the last surviving trustee the person or persons designated as bene-
ficiaries who are living at the death of the last surviving trustee shall be the holders
of the account (as joint owmers with right of survivorship if more than one) and any
payment to the holder or any of such holders shall be a complete discharge of the
association's obligations as to the amount so paid [italics added].27
Though this section appears to have been primarily intended to protect the as-
sociation from liability on paying out the account, it could also be interpreted as
giving the designated beneficiary at least a presumptive right to the deposit,.2 8
The use of the words owners and holder so suggests, and, furthermore, the new
act repealed the Savings'and Loan Act of 191929 but did not repeal a portion
enacted in 1939 which was specifically directed to limiting the liability of the
association in paying the proceeds of trust accounts to fiduciaries and benefici-
aries.0 A second section whose sole 'object was to protect the associations from
liability would be redundant.
26The interview with an officer of the bank or savings and loan association when a new
account is opened should provide the depositor with an awareness of the consequences of
-using the trust form of account and protect against fraud or forgery. The identity of a person
subsequently attempting to change the form of an account or the name of a beneficiary could
be checked against the recorded signature of the depositor on the signature card. An oral or
written declaration of revocation which is not delivered to the institution may create an oppor-
tunity for forgery or fraud as some courts have viewed such conduct as evidence of a revocation.
Consult Manner and Sufficiency- of Revocation of'Tdntative ("Totten") Trust of Savings
'Bank Account, 38 A.L.R. 2d 1243, at §§ 7 and 9 (1954). A codification of the savings-account
trust should consider limits on the methods of revocation to insure against fraud or forgery.
Consult N.J. Rev. Stat. (1954) § 17:9A-216(1) and (3).
27The portion of section 770 of Ill. Rev. Stat. (1§55) c. 32 which precedes paragraph (b)(3)
provides: "(b) If one or more persons opening or holding a withdrawable capital account
shall execute a written agreement with the association providing that the account shall be
held in the name of such person or persons as trustees for one or more persons designated as
beneficiaries, the account and any balance thereof which exists from time to time, shall be
held as a: trust account and unless otherwise agreed between the trustees and the association:
(1) Any such trustee during his lifetime may change any of the designated beneficiaries by a
written direction accepted by the association; and (2) Any such trustee may withdraw or
receive payment in cash or check payable to his personal order and any payment or withdrawal
shall constitute a revocation of the agreement as to the amount-withdrawn...."
Banking legislation similar to section 770 of the Savings and Loan Act does not exist. Com-
pare the protective bank liability statute-note 3 supra. Amendments to the banking laws gre
subject to a referendum by Illinois voters, which makes changes difficult. Ill. Const. Art. XI,
§ 5. A new banking statute is presently awaiting approval by referendum, but it retains sub-
stantially the same protective bank liability clause and incorporates no other changes on this
subject. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 161, § 145 eff. Jan. 1, 1957, subject to adoption at referendum
election.
28 Consult authorities cited note 5 supra and note 33 infra.
29 Ill, Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 32 § 944. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1955), c. 32, § 953.
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The argument that the savings-account trust ought not to be sustained be-
cause the settlor might well have intended something other than vesting an
interest in the beneficiary 3' can be met in two ways. First, it can be argued that
the extensive use of the savings-account trust in Illinois over the past thirty
years without litigation indicates that in the vast majority of cases the deposi-
tor-trustee knew what he was doing when he designated himself as trustee and
that he intended to pass some interest to the named beneficiary even if only an
expectancy. Second, the Illinois Court could well adopt the solution used in
other jurisdictions32 of declaring that the mere form of the deposit will not be
conclusive but only presumptive evidence of the settlor's intention to convey an
interest which may be rebutted by parol evidence.33 This last device would pre-
vent injustice whenever it could be shown that the depositor-trustee did not
intend to give any interest to the designated beneficiary. It would, of course,
decrease the simplicity of operation of the savings-account trust, but it would
seem far better to suffer the limited number of suits likely to arise than to cast
into doubt the validity, of the thousands of existing accounts which have gone
unchallenged.
Other problems have arisen from the use of the savings-account trust. The
surviving spouse has interjected statutory marital claims, and creditors of the
depositor have claimed a right to the trust proceeds. Their rights may be deter-
mined by reference to the experience of other jurisdictions.34 These problems
1 Consult note 9 supra.
32 Consult authorities cited note 5 supra.
33 The Illinois courts may well feel bound on this issue by Estate of Schneider, 6 Ill.
2d 180, 127 N.E. 2d 445 (1955), which held that because joint bank accounts are established
for a number of reasons, the mere wording of the agreement setting up the joint account was
not conclusive evidence of the donor's intent to establish a survivorship interest. In other
words, parol evidence was admissible to show that donor did not intend that the other party
should have survivorship right to the account. In actual fact there is very little difference be-
tween a savings-account trust and a joint account because where only one party has deposited
in the account, banks and savings and. loan associations generally will not pay out to' the
order of the donee unless he has physical possession of the bank book or is willing to eiecute
an indemnification agreement. This means that -with a joint account the donor has sub-
stantially the same control over the account that the depositor-trustee has in a savings-
account trust, although technically the donee of a joint account may withdraw from the
account at will whereas the beneficiary of a trust account has no right to the account before the
death of the depositor-trustee.
31 The right of a surviving spouse to the trust proceeds usually depends on whether the trust
was merely a device to defeat the wife's interest with the husband retaining control. Newman
v. Dore, 275 N.Y. 371, 9 N.E. 2d 966 (1937); In re Halpern's Estate, 303 N.Y. 33, 100 N.E.
2d 120 (1951). An Illinois decision on a depositor-trustee's wife's claim to a savings-account
trust may be controlled by Smith v. Northern Trust Co., 322 Ill. App. 168, 54 N.E. 2d 75
(1944), in which. it was held that a wife had a marital right where the trust was a mere de-
vice by which the husband did not part with absolute control. Consult 1 Bogert, Trusts and
Trustees, § 47, at 18 n. 83 (Supp., 1954); 4 Powell, Real Property. § 570, at 434 n. 25 (1954).
The rights of creditors to priority over the beneficiary in the trust proceeds has been litigated
favorably to the creditors. Cohsult 1 Bogert, Trusts and Trustees § 47, at n. 61a (Supp., 1954);
4 Powell, Real Property § 570, at 434 nn. 22-24 (1954).
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aiid those of establishing the settlor's intent and revocation could be most
efficiently handled by a: codification similar to that of New Jersey.35
Finally it may be urged that the savings-account trust is a useful device be-
cause of the simplicity of its operation over other forms of estate transfer." It
-eliminates many expenses of administration, and it provides a simple solution to
routine problems of cash management and estate transfer.
34N.J. Rev. Stat. (1954) § 17:9A-216. Consult 4 Powell, Real Property § 571, at 437
(1954) for problems left unresolved by the New Jersey codification.
36 A minimum of nine months is required to wind up an estate in which a will is involved.
111.-Rev. Stat. (1955) c. 3, § 242. A contest may postpone distribution for a number of years.
Distribution under the Illinois "small estates" provision is of limited use because its relatively
informal procedure is available only for estates of less than $1,000.00. Ill. Rev. Stat. (1954)
c. 3, 6-478.
VOTING ELIGIBILITY UNDER NLRA § 9(c)(3) OF UNREPLACED
ECONOMIC STRIKERS SUBJECT TO DISCHARGE
FOR WRONGFUL CONDUCT
Section 9(c) (3) of the National Labor Relations Act, as amended,1 provides,
in part, that "[e]mployees on strike who are not entitled to reinstatement shall
riot be eligible to vote" in a representation election. The Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia was recently called upon to make the first judicial deter-
mination of the impact of this provision on the voting eligibility of non-replaced
strikers guilty of misconduct during a strike.2
While an economic'- strike against the Union Manufacturing Company was
in progress, an election was held to determine whether the American Federation
of Hosiery Workers, A.F. of L., was to be certified as the employees' bargaining
representative. The company challenged the voting eligibility of a number of the
strikers on the ground of their misconduct 4 during the strike. The disputed
" f61 Stat. 136 (1947), 29 U.S.C.A. § 151 (Supp., 1955).
2 Union Mfg. Co. v. NLRB, 221 F. 2d 532 (App. D.C., 1955), cert. denied 349 U.S. 921
(-1955).
2The NLRB has distinguished between "unfair labor practice" strikes, i.e., strikes provoked
or prolonged by-an employer's unfair labor practice, and "economic" strikes, i.e., strikes called
to obtain economic benefits such as changes in wages, hours or other working conditions. See
"NLRB v. A. Sartorius & Co., 140 F. 2d 203 (C.A. 2d, 1944). The primary importance of the
distinction is in its bearing on an employer's right to replace strikers. An employer is at liberty
permanently to replace "economic" strikers. E.g., NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co.,
304 U.S. 333 (1938). In contrast, strikers in an "unfair labor practice" strike are entitled to
reinstatement even if they have been replaced. E.g., Wheatland Electric Cooperative, Inc. v.
NLRB, 208 F. 2d 878 (C.A. 10th, 1953), cert. denied 347 U.S. 966 (1954). Unless otherwise
indicated, ensuing discussion will have reference to "economic" strikes and strikers.
4 udge Danaher's- dissenting opinion states that the strikers were charged with "debar-
ment, violence, mass picketing, and generally lawless conduct on the picket line." Union Mfg.
Co.-v. NLRB; 221 F. 2d 532, 537 (App. D.C., 1955), cert. denied 349 U.S. 921 (1955). Such
acts of misconduct, if proven, are sufficient to warrant a denial of reinstatement. NLRB v.
Perfect Circle Co., 162 F. 2d 566 (C.A. 7th, 1949) (debarment); NLRB v. Ohio Calcium Co.,
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